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& 
Some significant consequences of interpreting arithmetical 
‘truth’ constructively in Gödel’s formal reasoning 
Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
Standard expositions of Gödel’s 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical 
propositions are based on two presumptions in Gödel’s 1931 interpretation 
of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem 
XI - which do not meet Gödel’s requirement of classically constructive, 
and intuitionistically unobjectionable, reasoning. We see how these 
objections can be addressed, and note some consequences thereof. 
I Gödel’s first, classically objectionable, presumption 
I-1 Introduction 
The difficulty in situating an interpretation2 of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem - 
Theorem VI in [Go31] - within the perspectives of classical (pre-Cantorian) reasoning, 
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arise simply because standard expositions3 of Gödel’s formal reasoning in his 1931 paper 
[Go31] on undecidable arithmetical propositions - which are, essentially, still based on 
Gödel’s interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning in this paper - have yet to explicitly 
recognise that: 
(a) the truth of Gödel’s unprovable proposition - which, syntactically, is of the form 
[(∀x)R(x)] - follows strictly from the axioms and rules of inference of Peano 
Arithmetic; 
(b) all the axioms and theorems of Peano Arithmetic are algorithmically (Turing) 
computable arithmetical truths (when treated as Boolean functions) under the 
standard interpretation; 
(c) there may be arithmetical relations - such as the one constructed by Gödel in his 
1931 paper - which are meta-mathematically provable as instantiationally 
computable (Turing-decidable) truths, but which may not necessarily be 
algorithmically computable (Turing-computable) truths. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Mathematically, following Tarski ([Me64], §2, p49): “An interpretation consists of a non-empty set D, 
called the domain of the interpretation, and an assignment to each predicate letter Aj
n
 of an n-place relation 
in D, to each function letter fjn of an n-place operation in D (i.e., a function from Dn into D), and to each 
individual constant ai of some fixed element of D. Given such an interpretation, variables are thought of as 
ranging over the set D, and ~, =>, and quantifiers are given their usual meaning. (Remember that an n-
place relation in D can be thought of as a subset of Dn, the set of all n-tuples of elements of D.)” 
 
We note that the interpreted relation R'(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of a formal system P by 
replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical 
symbol. So the P-formula [(∀x)R(x)] interprets as the sentence (∀x)R'(x), and the P-formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] as 
the sentence ¬(∀x)R'(x). 
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(d) under a constructive interpretation of arithmetical ‘truth’ in Gödel’s formal 
reasoning, any first-order Peano Arithmetic is naturally ω-inconsistent, and has 
no non-standard models (one significant consequence of this is that P ≠ NP4). 
I-2 The truth of Gödel’s unprovable proposition follows strictly from the axioms 
and rules of inference of Peano Arithmetic 
It is a common misconception that an arithmetical statement - such as the one constructed 
by Gödel - can be true and yet not proven from the axioms and rules of inference of a 
first order Peano Arithmetic.5 
However, the truth of Gödel's unprovable proposition does follow strictly from the 
axioms and rules of inference of PA. 
To see this, note that the first part of Gödel’s argument in Theorem VI of his 1931 paper 
[Go31] is, simply, that, if PA is consistent, then we can mechanically construct a PA 
formula6 - which, syntactically, is of the form [(∀x)R(x)] - such that: 
(i) the formula [(∀x)R(x)] - when expressed purely as a string of symbols - does not 
follow mechanically from the axioms of PA as the last of any finite sequence of 
PA-formulas, each of which is either a PA-axiom, or a consequence of one or 
more of the formulas preceding it in the sequence, by the mechanical 
application of the rules of inference of PA; 
                                                 
4
 For the significance of the PvsNP problem, see [Cook]. 
 
5
 This is the essence of the Gödelian argument initially put forward by Lucas [Lu61][Lu96], and defended 
vigorously by Penrose [Pe90][Pe94][Pe96]. 
 
6
 This follows from Gödel’s Theorem VII in [Go31], and the fact that Gödel’s formal system P is defined 
recursively, in the sense that there exists a Turing machine which will, when presented with any input 
string, halt and accept if the string is a well-formed formula of the system, and halt and reject otherwise. 
 
 4 
(ii) for any given numeral [n] - which ‘represents’ the natural number n in PA - 
each of the formulas [R(n)] - again, when expressed purely as a string of 
symbols - does follow mechanically from the axioms of PA as the last of some 
finite sequence of PA-formulas, each of which is either a PA-axiom, or a 
consequence of one or more of the formulas preceding it in the sequence, by the 
mechanical application of the rules of inference of PA. 
Now, (i) is, essentially, the standard definition (due to Gödel) of the meta-assertion: 
(iii) The PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is unprovable in PA, 
whilst (ii) is, essentially, the standard definition (due to Tarski) of the meta-assertion: 
(iv) The PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is true in PA. 
Hence, by definition, the appropriate interpretation of Gödel’s reasoning (i) and (ii) ought 
to be7: 
(v) The PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is unprovable but true in PA. 
However standard expositions of Gödel’s formal reasoning in [Go31] assert only that: 
(vi) The PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is unprovable in PA, but true in the standard 
interpretation of PA. 
They, thus, fail to highlight the fact that (i) and (ii), both, actually, follow strictly from 
the axioms and rules of inference of PA, and that the meta-assertion: 
(vii) The PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is true in the standard interpretation of PA, 
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classically, implies8 the meta-assertion: 
(viii) The PA-formula [R(x)] is provable in PA whenever we substitute a numeral [n] 
for the variable [x] in [R(x)]. 
In other words, classically, (vii) also asserts the instantiational PA-provability of a 
denumerable infinity of arithmetical propositions.  
The question arises: When is a PA-true formula, such as, say, [(∀x)R(x)], also PA-
provable? 
I-3 The axioms and theorems of Peano Arithmetic are algorithmically (Turing) 
computable truths under the standard interpretation 
Now, it follows from Turing’s 1936 paper [Tu36] that if, say, the formula [R'(x1, x2, x3 
…, xn)]9 is either an axiom, or a theorem10, of a Peano Arithmetic (such as the system P 
considered by Gödel in his 1931 paper), then there is always a Turing-machine11, T, such 
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that, for any set of natural numbers (a1, a2, a3 …, an), T will compute the arithmetical 
proposition R'(a1, a2, a3 …, an) as TRUE in a finite number of steps (Appendix A). 
Gödel’s remarkable achievement in [Go31] lay in his actual construction - using only 
classically acceptable reasoning - of a formula of one variable in P, say [R (x)], such that: 
(iii) [(∀x)R(x)] is not a theorem of P (assuming that P is consistent); 
(iv) for any natural number a, there is a Turing-machine Ta that will compute the 
arithmetical proposition R(a) as TRUE in a finite number of steps. 
However, we cannot assume from this that there must be a single Turing machine T' such 
that, for any natural number a, T' will compute the arithmetical proposition R(a) as 
TRUE in a finite number of steps.12 
I-4 The distinction between classical verifiability and Turing-computability 
In other words, the precise definition of the algorithmic computability of number-
theoretic functions - formalised by Turing in his 1936 paper [Tu36] on computable 
numbers - allows the following distinction to be made between the instantiational 
decidability of number-theoretic relations, and their algorithmic computability (when 
treated as Boolean functions): 
Definition 1: A total number-theoretical relation, say R'(x1, x2, ..., xn), when treated 
as a Boolean function, is Turing-decidable in M if, and only if, it is instantiationally 
equivalent to a number-theoretic relation, S(x1, x2, ..., xn), and there is a Turing-
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machine T such that, for any given natural number sequence, (a1, a2, ..., an), T will 
compute S(a1, a2, ..., an) as either TRUE, or as FALSE. 
Definition 2: A total number-theoretical relation, R'(x1, x2, ..., xn), when treated as a 
Boolean function, is Turing-computable in M if, and only if, there is a Turing-
machine T such that, for any given natural number sequence, (a1, a2, ..., an), T will 
compute R'(a1, a2, ..., an) as either TRUE, or as FALSE. 
Note that although Turing-decidability (which is, essentially, verifiability in the classical 
sense) of a number-theoretic relation necessarily implies Turing-computability, the 
converse need not hold.  
Thus, classically, a number-theoretic relation, such as, say Gödel’s R(x), would be 
decidable (Turing-decidable) as true if it were instantiationally equivalent, for any given 
natural number, to a number-theoretic relation, S(x), which could be interpreted as a 
Turing-algorithm, and which is Turing-computable as TRUE for all natural numbers.  
However, we cannot conclude from this that R(x) must also be interpretable as a Turing-
algorithm, and be Turing-computable as TRUE for all natural numbers. 
In other words - as in the case of Turing’s Halting function - the definition of R(x) may 
involve a, possibly implicit, circular reference to the totality of values of R(x).  
Consequently, any Turing-machine that computes R(x) could go into a non-terminating 
loop for some input (i.e., in the language of Turing-machines, an instantaneous tape 
description could be repeated in the course of the computation for that input). 
Now, in his 1931 paper [Go31], Gödel only shows that, if PA is consistent, then his R(x) 
is Turing-decidable as always TRUE (when treated as a Boolean function). 
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The Turing-decidability of Gödel’s R(x) follows from the fact that R (x) is defined 
constructively by Gödel (as a consequence of Theorem VII of [Go31]) so that it is 
instantiationally equivalent to a primitive recursive relation which, of course, is known to 
be Turing-computable. 
However, the question remains: 
Is R(x) also Turing-computable as always TRUE (when treated as a Boolean function)? 
If we interpret Gödel’s reasoning with the above distinction in mind, then his PA-formula 
[(∀x)R(x)] may be13 unprovable, but true, simply because the arithmetical relation R(x) is 
a ‘Halting’ type of relation that is Turing-decidable as always TRUE, but not Turing-
computable as always TRUE14. 
I-5 Gödel’s first, classically objectionable, presumption 
It is intriguing to speculate on why the above distinction was not considered by Gödel 
even after Turing’s publication of his paper [Tu36] on computable numbers. 
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A contributing factor may have been his 1931 commitment to the first of his classically 
objectionable presumptions: the assumption of ω-consistency for P will not lead to an 
inconsistency15. 
This allowed him to meta-mathematically argue further - again, using only classically 
acceptable reasoning - that the formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] is, also, not a theorem of an ω-
consistent P. 
Another factor may have been Gödel’s reluctant acceptance, along with Church, of the 
thesis (now known as the Church-Turing Thesis) identifying effectively computable16 
number-theoretic functions with algorithmically computable number-theoretic functions. 
From the first, Gödel concluded his first incompleteness theorem (Theorem VI of his 
1931 paper), to the effect that, if P can be assumed ω-consistent, then the formulas 
[(∀x)R(x)] and [¬(∀x)R(x)] are, both, not provable in P. 
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Gödel’s reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic function can be effectively 
computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically. 
 
Since every algorithmically function is, necessarily, computable instantiationally, we can, then, indeed 
define a function as effectively computable (intuitively) if, and only if, it is computable instantiationally. 
 
The essence of Church’s Thesis would then be the postulation that every effectively computable function is 
(instantiationally) equivalent to a recursive function. 
 
Note that, in its standard form, Church’s Thesis postulates a strong identity - and not simply a weak 
equivalence - between an effectively computable function and some recursive function. 
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The second may, quite possibly, have prevented him from recognising the possibility, and 
significance, of number-theoretic relations that are effectively computable as true 
instantiationally, but not algorithmically. 
I-6 Why the assumption of ω-consistency in a Peano Arithmetic is classically 
objectionable, and may invite inconsistency 
It is interesting to see how, and why, Gödel’s presumption - that P can be assumed ω-
consistent without inviting inconsistency - obscures the significance of his primary 
achievement - that of constructing a number-theoretic, arithmetical, relation that may be 
effectively computable as true instantiationally, but not necessarily algorithmically. 
Now, Gödel defines P as ω-consistent if, and only if, there is no P-formula, such as, say, 
his [R(x)], such that [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable, and also that [R(n)] is P-provable for any 
numeral [n] of P. 
The possible inconsistency in an ω-consistent P surfaces only when we try to interpret 
the above definition verifiably in our classical arithmetic based on Dedekind’s Peano 
Postulates (termed as the “standard interpretation of Peano Arithmetic”), which Gödel’s 
system P was intended to formalise recursively (hence, implicitly, algorithmically). 
Now, it is reasonable to suppose that Gödel’s tacit justification for the presumption of ω-
consistency as an intuitively natural, and consistent, meta-property of P lay in the 
following argument: 
(a) if [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable, then the meta-proposition, “R(x) is true for all 
natural numbers x”, is false, 
and: 
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(b) if [R(n)] is P-provable for any numeral [n] of P, then the meta-proposition, “R(x) 
is true for all natural numbers x”, is true. 
However, if we note, first, that the phrase, “R(x) is true for all natural numbers x”, is 
ambiguous, and can be taken to mean either, “R(x) is effectively computable as true 
algorithmically (Turing-computable) for all natural numbers x”, or, “R(x) is effectively 
computable as true instantiationally (Turing-decidable) for all natural numbers x”, and, 
second, that the latter need not, necessarily, imply the former, then we can, indeed, have 
that: 
(c) if [¬(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable, then the meta-proposition, “R(x) is effectively 
computable as true algorithmically (Turing-computable) for all natural numbers x”, 
is false 
and, at the same time, that: 
(d) if [R(n)] is P-provable for any numeral [n] of P, then the meta-proposition, “R(x) 
is effectively computable as true instantiationally (Turing-decidable) for all natural 
numbers x”, is true.   
I-7 A constructive interpretation of ω-consistency implies that Gödel’s (first 
incompleteness) Theorem VI may be vacuously true 
It follows that Gödel’s presumption that assuming ω-consistency for P will not lead to an 
inconsistency is questionable, and hence his argument for the construction of an 
undecidable proposition in P, cannot be considered classically constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable. 
It also follows that we cannot, further, conclude from Gödel’s reasoning that his 
proposition, [¬(∀x)R(x)], is necessarily not P-provable. 
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I-8 Rosser’s argument, too, implicitly assumes that Peano Arithmetic is ω-
consistent 
Contrary to the accepted view, Rosser’s ‘extension’ of Gödel’s argument [Ro36] also 
assumes - albeit, implicitly - that P is ω-consistent. 
Thus, in his proof, Rosser argues at one point17 that if we assume that a formula such as, 
say, [(∃x)F(x)], is provable in a consistent P, then we can assume, further, that there is 
some P-formula, say [a], such that [F(a)] is provable. 
He, then, argues that the P-provability of [F(a)] leads to a contradiction, and concludes 
that [(∃x)F(x)] cannot be P-provable. 
Now, if P were ω-inconsistent, then, since, formally, [(∃x)F(x)] is defined as 
[¬(∀x)¬F(x)], we can, indeed, have, both, that [¬(∀x)¬F(x)] is P-provable, and that 
[¬F(x)] is also P-provable for all substitutions of a P-formula [a] for [x]. 
Hence, unless we assume that P is ω-consistent, we cannot conclude - as Rosser does - 
that, from the P-provability of [¬(∀x)¬F(x)], there is, necessarily, some P-formula, say 
[a], such that [F(a)] is provable.18 
I-9 If Peano Arithmetic is ω-inconsistent, then it may have no non-constructive, 
non-standard, models 
Now, if we cannot conclude that [¬(∀x)R(x)] is necessarily not P-provable, then we 
cannot conclude that we can add [¬(∀x)R(x)] as an axiom to P and obtain a consistent, 
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extended, system of Peano Arithmetic, which contains numbers that are not natural 
numbers. 
However, it is precisely the unvalidated presumption by Gödel that P+[¬(∀x)R(x)]  is 
consistent [Go31], which appears to underpin the postulation of non-standard models19 of 
Peano Arithmetic. 
These are models that postulate the existence of numbers, satisfying the axioms of Peano 
Arithmetic, which exist in the domain of an interpretation, and can, possibly, be named, 
but which are not numerals, and, so, cannot be constructed within the Arithmetic. 
In Appendix B we show, however, that all the elements in the domain of any model of 
PA are necessarily the numerals (which, by definition, are the successors of 0) and so PA 
has no non-standard models.  
So, if we cannot add [¬(∀x)R(x)] as an axiom to P without inviting inconsistency, it 
follows that P is ω-inconsistent. 
I-10 A significant consequence of a constructive interpretation of Gödel’s 
reasoning in Theorem VI of his 1931 paper: P ≠ NP 
We are, thus, compelled to seek alternative, and more constructive, interpretations of the 
significance, and consequences, of Gödel’s reasoning in his 1931 paper.20 
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satisfiability and truth of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation).  
 
We define a non-standard model, say M', of first-order Peano Arithmetic as one in which, if [(∀x)R(x)] is 
Gödel’s undecidable formula, then ~R(s) holds for some s in the domain of M' that is not a natural number 
(i.e., s is not a successor of 0). 
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computability (http://alixcomsi.com/PA_is_instantiationally_complete.htm). 
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One of the more significant consequences is that if a total arithmetical relation is Turing-
computable as always TRUE, then it is PA-provable. 
For, if we assume that there is a total arithmetical relation that is Turing-computable as 
always TRUE, but which is not the standard interpretation of a PA-provable formula, 
then this implies that there is a non-standard model of PA. 
Another follows from the argument that (cf. [Ra02]), if there is no polynomial time 
algorithm A that gets as input a Boolean formula f and outputs 1 if and only if f is a 
tautology, then P ≠ NP. 
Hence Gödel’s reasoning in Theorem VI of [Go31] - to the effect that there is a total 
arithmetical relation that is Turing-decidable as always TRUE, but which is not Turing-
computable as always TRUE - implies that P ≠ NP. 
II Gödel’s second, classically objectionable, presumption 
II-1 Gödel’s reasoning in his (second incompleteness) Theorem XI 
The second of Gödel’s classically objectionable presumptions pertains to the reasoning 
by which he constructs another P-formula, [W] (say, with Gödel-number w), and 
concludes that, when [W] is interpreted in our intuitive arithmetic of the natural numbers 
(as covered by Dedekind’s formulations of the Peano Axioms), it intuitively translates as 
an arithmetical proposition that is true if, and only if, a specified formula of P is 
unprovable in P. 
Now, if there were such a P-formula as [W] which interprets, and intuitively translates, as 
above, and we could prove [W] in P, then the above would imply that there is a proof 
sequence in P to the effect that P contains an unprovable formula, and so we would have 
proved that P is consistent by a proof sequence within P. 
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This follows since, classically, an inconsistent system necessarily proves every well-
formed formula of the system. 
Now Gödel shows - again by classical reasoning - that his formula [W] is not P-provable. 
From this he concludes his second incompleteness theorem (Theorem XI of his 1931 
paper), to the effect that the consistency of a Peano Arithmetic cannot be proven within 
the Arithmetic. 
II-2 Gödel presumes that he has constructed an arithmetical proposition that 
translates intuitively as true if, and only if, P is consistent 
Now, the classically objectionable presumption made by Gödel is that, when the P-
formula [W] is interpreted in our intuitive arithmetic of the natural numbers (as covered 
by Dedekind’s formulations of the Peano Axioms), it intuitively translates as an 
arithmetical proposition, say W, that is true if, and only if, a specified formula of P is 
unprovable in P. 
To see the classically objectionable step of Gödel’s reasoning in Theorem XI of his 1931 
paper, it is necessary to see how Gödel shows, in a constructive, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable manner, how meta-propositions of a formal Peano Arithmetic, say P, can 
be defined by means of primitive recursive functions and relations using only classical 
reasoning. 
II-3 Gödel defines 45 number-theoretic primitive recursive functions and relations 
Amongst the 46 such number-theoretic functions and relations defined by Gödel, in a 
classically constructive manner, are the following: 
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(#12) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Var(x), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number21 of a variable of P. 
(#13) A number-theoretic primitive recursive function, Neg(x), which is the Gödel-
number of the negation of the formula of P whose Gödel-number is x. 
(#14) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, xDisy, which is true if, and 
only if, the disjunction of the formulas of P, whose Gödel-numbers are x and y, 
is true. 
(#15) A number-theoretic primitive recursive function, xGeny, which is true if, and 
only if, the generalisation of the formula of P whose Gödel-number is y, by the 
the formula whose Gödel-number is x, is true (assuming that x is the Gödel-
number of a formula of P that is a variable). 
(#17) A number-theoretic primitive recursive function, Z(n), which is the Gödel-
number of the numeral of P that represents the natural number n. 
(#20) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Elf(x), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number of an elementary formula of P. 
(#22) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, FR(x), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number of a sequence of formulas of P, each one of 
which is either an elementary formula of P, or comes from the preceding ones 
by the operations of negation, disjunction, or generalisation. 
                                                 
21
 In [Go3], p13, Gödel sets up a 1-1 correspondence of natural numbers to the primitive symbols, 
formulas, and finite sequences of formulas, of PA, in such a manner that various meta-mathematical 
functions and relations involving concepts such as, e.g., “variable”, “formula”, “sentence”, “axiom”, 
“provable formula”, etc., can be expressed as equivalent to number-theoretic functions and relations. 
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(#23) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Form(x), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number of a formula of P (i.e., the last term of a sequence 
of formulas). 
(#26) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, vFrx, which is true if, and only 
if, x is the Gödel-number of a formula of P in which the variable of P, whose 
Gödel-number is v, is free. 
(#29) A number-theoretic primitive recursive function, A(v, x), which is the number 
of places at which the variable of P, whose Gödel-number is v, is free in the 
formula of P whose Gödel-number is x. 
(#42) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Ax(x), which is true if, and only 
if, x is the Gödel-number of an axiom of P. 
(#43) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Fl(x, y, z), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number of a formula of P that is an immediate 
consequence of the formulas of P whose Gödel-numbers are y and z. 
(#44) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Bw(x), which is true if, and 
only if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence in P (a finite sequence of 
formulas of P each of which is either an axiom of P, or an immediate 
consequence of two preceding formulas of the sequence). 
(#45) A number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, xBy, which is true if, and only 
if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence of P whose last formula has the 
Gödel-number y. 
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The classically constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, nature of the above, 
45, representation of various meta-mathematical propositions by primitive recursive 
functions and relations is assured by Gödel by the following specification (in a footnote): 
“Everywhere in the following definitions where one of the expressions ‘(∀x)’, ‘(∃x)’, 
‘(There is a unique x)’ occurs it is followed by a bound for x. This bound serves only 
to assure the recursive nature of the defined concept.” 
In sharp contrast to the above 45 definitions, Gödel explicitly defines one further meta-
mathematical relation that cannot be asserted to be recursive: 
(#46) The number-theoretic relation, Bew(x), which is true if, and only if, x is the 
Gödel-number of a provable formula of P. 
Gödel's actual definition of (#46) is: 
(#46) The number-theoretic primitive recursive relation, Bew(x), is true if, and only if, 
the number-theoretic relation (∃y)yBx is true. 
The significance of the distinction, between the first 45 definitions and the 46th, is that, by 
Gödel’s Theorem VII (which is independent of his Theorem VI, and should actually have 
preceded it), it can be shown that any recursive relation, say Q(x), can be represented in P 
by some, corresponding, arithmetical formula, say [R(x)], such that, for any natural 
number n: 
If Q(n) is true, then [R(n)] is P-provable 
If Q(n) is false, then [¬R(n)] is P-provable. 
Now, Gödel’s Theorem VI establishes that the above representation does not extend to 
the closure of a recursive relation, in the sense that we cannot assume: 
 19 
If (∀x)Q(x) is true (over all the natural numbers), then [(∀x)R(x)] is P-provable. 
In other words, we cannot assume that, even though the recursive relation, Q(x), can be 
represented in P by some arithmetical formula, the number-theoretic proposition 
(∀x)Q(x) must, necessarily, also be representable similarly. 
However this, precisely, is the presumption made by Gödel in his Theorem XI (where he 
concludes that the consistency of P is not P-provable). 
Thus, he first defines the notion of “P is consistent” in a classically constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, manner, as follows: 
P is consistent if, and only if, the number-theoretic relation Wid(P) is true. 
Here, Wid(P) is defined by the number-theoretic relation: 
(∃x)[Form(x) & ¬(Bew(x)] 
The above translates intuitively as: 
There is a natural number x such that x is the Gödel-number of a formula of P, and 
this formula is not P-provable. 
That this implies the consistency of P follows from the classical definition of the 
consistency of any formal axiomatic theory, since, if the theory were inconsistent, then 
every well-formed formula of the theory would be provable within the theory. 
Now, Gödel’s classically objectionable step lies in his presumption that Wid(P) can be 
represented ([Go31] uses the term “expressed”) by some formula [W] of P, with Gödel-
number w, that, under the standard interpretation, maintains its intuitive meaning. 
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To see why the presumption is objectionable, it is sufficient to note that - again without 
adequate justification - Gödel also presumes in the proof of his Theorem XI [Go31] that 
if the recursive relation, Q(x, p), is represented by the P-formula [R(x, p)], whose Gödel-
number is r, then (∀x)Q(x, p) can be “expressed” in P by the formula [(∀x)R(x, p)], 
whose Gödel-number is 17Genr, in such a manner that the proposition “[(∀x)R(x, p)] is 
true” has the same intuitive meaning, under the standard interpretation, as “(∀x)Q(x, p) is 
true”. 
As noted earlier, such an assumption does, indeed, follow if R(x, p) is Turing-computable 
as always TRUE, but it may not follow if R(x, p) is Turing-decidable as always TRUE, 
but not Turing-computable as always TRUE. 
In other words, if [W], too, is unprovable but true in P, then the consistency of P is, in 
fact, provable instantiationally in P. 
Hence, at best, Gödel’s reasoning can only be taken to establish that the consistency of P 
is unprovable algorithmically in P. 
The significance of this is that we can no longer argue that if the consistency of a system 
that contains a Peano Arithmetic is, somehow, provable within the system, then the 
system must be inconsistent. 
This conclusion can only be drawn for such a system if it purports to prove its own 
consistency algorithmically. 
Appendix A: The Theorems of PA interpret as Turing-
computable truths 
Consider the axioms of PA: 
(S1)  [(x1 = x2) → ((x1 = x3) → (x2 = x3))]; 
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(S2)  [(x1 = x2) → (x1' = x2')]; 
(S3)  [0 ≠ (x1)']; 
(S4)  [((x1)' = (x2)') → (x1 = x2)]; 
(S5)  [(x1 + 0) = x1]; 
(S6)  [(x1 + x2') = (x1 + x2)']; 
(S7)  [(x1*0) = 0] 
(S8)  [(x1*( x2')) = ((x1* x2) + x1)]; 
(S9)  For any well-formed formula [F(x)] of PA: 
[F(0) → ((∀x)(F(x) → F(x')) → (∀x)F(x))]. 
Under the standard interpretation, M, each of the PA axioms - except Induction - is 
Turing-computable as always TRUE in the following sense: 
Definition: A total number-theoretical relation, R(x1, x2, ..., xn), when treated as a 
Boolean function, is Turing-computable in M if, and only if, there is a Turing-
machine T such that, for any given natural number sequence, (a1, a2, ..., an), T will 
compute R(a1, a2, ..., an) as either TRUE, or as FALSE. 
(i) If [R] is an atomic formula [R(a1, a2, ..., an)] of PA, then [R] is Turing-computable 
as TRUE for the natural number input (a1, a2, ..., an) if, and only if, the arithmetical 
relation R(a1, a2, ..., an) is Turing-computable as TRUE on the natural number input 
(a1, a2, ..., an); 
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(ii) The PA-formula [¬R] is Turing-computable as TRUE for the natural number input 
(a1, a2, ..., an) if, and only if, [R] is Turing-computable as FALSE for the natural 
number input (a1, a2, ..., an); 
(iii) The PA-formula [R => S] is Turing-computable as TRUE for the natural number 
input (a1, a2, ..., an) if, and only if, either [R] is Turing-computable as FALSE for the 
natural number input (a1, a2, ..., an), or [S] is Turing-computable as TRUE for the 
natural number input (a1, a2, ..., an); 
(iv) The PA-formula [(∀xi)R] is Turing-computable as TRUE for the natural number 
input (a1, a2, ..., an) if, and only if, [R] is Turing-computable as TRUE for every 
natural number input (b1, b2, ..., bn) where (b1, b2, ..., bn) differs from (a1, a2, ..., an) in 
at most the i’th component. 
Further, it is easily seen that the following rules of Inference in PA preserve the above 
Turing-computability under the standard interpretation: 
(vii)  Modus Ponens: [B] follows from [A] and [A → B]; 
(viii) Generalisation: [(∀x)A] follows from [A]. 
 It follows that the Theorems of PA are Turing-computable as always TRUE in the above 
sense. 
Appendix B: Standard, first-order, PA has no non-standard 
model 
We give an elementary proof that, if PA is a standard, first-order, Peano Arithmetic - as 
defined in Appendix A - then PA has no non-standard model (i.e., a model whose domain 
contains an element that is not a successor of 0). 
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 We denote by G(x) the PA-formula: 
 [x=0 v ¬(∀y)¬(x=y')]. 
This translates, under every interpretation of PA, as: 
Either x is 0, or x is a ‘successor’. 
Now, in every interpretation of PA, we have that: 
(a) G(0) is true; 
(b) If G(x) is true, then G(x') is true. 
It follows, from Gödel's completeness theorem22, that: 
(a) [G(0)] is provable in PA; 
(b) [G(x) => G(x')] is provable in PA. 
We also have, by Generalisation (Appendix A), that: 
(c) [(∀x)(G(x) => G(x'))] is provable in PA; 
From the Induction axiom S9 (Appendix A), we thus have that: 
(d) [(∀x)G(x)] is provable in PA. 
We conclude that, except 0, every element in the domain of any interpretation of PA is a 
successor of 0. 
Since, by definition, the successors of 0 are the natural numbers, it follows that there are 
no non-standard models of a standard, first-order, Peano Arithmetic. 
                                                 
22
 Cf. [Me64], p68. 
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